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The Kara Homes decision held that various affiliates ofKara Homes, Inc.,
each of which owned a separate real estate project, were "single asset real estate"
("SARE'') cases under the Bankruptcy Code's definition. According to the author
ofthis article, the designation as single asset real estate substantially increased the
difficulty faced by the debtors in maintaining their reorganization efforts, and
has given lenders and their counsel a significant amount ofcomfort. However,
the definition runs against the actual wording ofthe Bankruptcy Code, the
intent underlying the SARE provisions, and the political winds. It should, and
may well, be reversed in subsequent cases.

n the real estate downturn of the late 1980s and early 19905, bankruptcy
posed a serious threat to commercial mortgage lenders, often hobbling
their ability to effectively enforce their rights to the mortgaged property.
This time around, however, changes in the lawl and in the structuring of
transactions 2 have significantly curtailed the problems lenders face in foreclosing on many properties and the changed framework is entitled to a great
deal of praise. However, in a 2007 case, In re Kara Homes, the court misinterpreted the definition of "single asset real estate," taking these protections
a step too far by holding the separate project subsidiaries of a development
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company to be single asset real estate companies. Unfortunately, a number of
other courts have followed Kara Homes, and this faulty interpretation threatens to become settled law, imposing an inappropriate and undue burden on
many troubled development and construction projects. 3
In Kara Homes,4 the bankruptcy court held that various affiliates ofKara
Homes, Inc., each of which owned a separate real estate project, were "single
asset real estate" ("SARE") cases under the Bankruptcy Code's definition. As
discussed herein, the designation as SARE substantially increased the difficulty faced by the debtors in maintaining their reorganization efforts. Lenders and their counsel have taken a significant amount of comfort from the
decision (and following cases) - but it runs against the actual wording of the
Code, the intent underlying the SARE provisions, and the political winds. It
should, and may well, be reversed in subsequent cases.

THE KARA HOMES CASE
Kara Homes, Inc. is a residential developer in New Jersey, doing both single family and condominium projects. It establishes separate entities (collectively, "the Affiliates") to hold, develop and sell the real estate for each project,
apparently using workers employed by Kara Homes and detailed out to the
Affiliates as needed. In late 2006, Kara Homes and the Affiliates all filed for
Chapter 11 protection. Given their interrelationships, the bankruptcy court
ordered that the cases be jointly administered, but did not order substantive
consolidation. On the bankruptcy petitions, the Affiliates were identified as
single asset real estate entities.
Shortly thereafter, the Affiliates filed complaints against the construction
lenders on the various projects, seeking declaratory judgment that they were
not actually single asset real estate entities. On cross motions for summary
judgment, however, the court held that they were SARE entities, as defined in
the Bankruptcy Code, and thus were subject to the special lender protections
in Section 363(d)(3) of the Code.
The debtors argued that they did not fall under the SARE definition
because each Affiliate was actively engaged in a substantial business beyond
operating the real property. Each had to acquire appropriate land, obtain site
approvals, design homes or condominiums for the property, arrange for the
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construction, and build common spaces, amenities and roadways.5
The court rejected this argument. relying in large part on the test enunciated in In re Philmont DelJ. Co. 6 Philmont set out a four part test for determining whether a debtor fell within the SARE definition:
Section 101(51B) enumerates four criteria which must exist before a
bankruptcy case falls within the scope of Section 101(51B). First, real
property constituting a single property or project, other than residential
real property with fewer than 4 residential units, falls within the scope of
sSection 10 1 (51 B). Second. that real property must generate substantially all of the income of the debtor. Third, the debtor must not be involved
in any substantial business other than the operation of its real property
and the activities incidental thereto. Fourth, the debtor's aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured debt must be less than $4,000,000. 7
Following this formulation, the Kara decision noted that each Affiliate
owned a single property or project. Second, the court reasoned, the real
property generated substantially all of each Affiliate's income because their
only source of income would be sale of the completed residences. The "true
point of contention," the court wrote, was whether the debtors' were engaged
in any substantial business other than the "operation of its real property and
activities incidental thereto."8 (The fourth Philmont requirement, having secured debt less than $4 million, was removed from the definition of SARE by
Congress in 2005.)
The court's conclusion was that the Affiliates fall within this third prong
as well:
The Affiliated Debtors are in the business of constructing and selling
single family homes on the parcels of real estate owned by the Affiliated
Debtors. In order to build and sell homes, it is often necessary to acquire the land on which to build the homes, and plan the community in
which they lie; likewise, it is necessary to market those homes for sale and
maintain the properties. All of the activities identified by the Debtors as
reflective of "business operations" are merely incidental to the Affiliated
Debtors efforts to sell these homes or condominium units and do not
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constitute substantial business .... Thus, the Court finds that the Affiliated Debtors fall within the definition of "single asset real estate" debtors
and, as such, 11 USC § 362(d)(3) applies. 9
The Kara court misapplied the test in Philmont, which did not deal with
entities that were developing real property. There were two different classes
of debtors in Philmont. Philmont Development owned partnership interests
in three other partnerships, as well as two undeveloped building lots. The
court found that Philmont Development was not SARE because its "purpose
is not the operation of real property nor is rental income its direct source
of income."10 The limited partnerships in which Philmont Development
had ownership interests were SARE, however, because the partnerships each
owned and managed a series of semi-detached housing. The court determined that while the semi-detached housing might not have been "single
property," it fell within the category of a "single project" for each partnership.
Notably, none of the partnerships in Philmont were involved in planning,
developing, or building any of the properties. Philmont Development would
develop the project, which the partnership would then purchase and manage.

THE BANKRUPTCY CODE'S SARE PROVISIONS
Congress originally adopted the added lender protections for SARE
bankruptcy cases in 1994, at the urging of lenders who felt that, in the real
estate downturn of the late 1980s, many borrowers with no real prospect for
reorganization had filed for bankruptcy simply to delay foreclosure and hope
for an upturn in the market. The arguments for limiting bankruptcy access
for single asset real estate entities were well summarized in the Bankruptcy
Review Commission's 1997 Single Asset Proposals:
SARE cases often serve few recognized goals of Chapter 11. First, confirmation of a plan provides minimal benefit to unsecured creditors.
Unsecured trade debt is typically paid after the property is foreclosed,
either by the purchaser, who wants to maintain the same services to the
property, or by the general partners of the debtor, who remain liable for
partnership debts. Second, the bankruptcy does not serve the purpose
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of eliminating the desrrucrive race among unsecured creditors. There is
typically only one significanr asscr, rhe real property, and that is generally
fully encumbered by the firsr mortgage. Third, the debtor often has no
equity in the property (0 preservc. In such cases, the debtor is not trying
to preserve a present economic interest, but rather is attempting to retain
the property in the hope thar irs value will increase in the future. Fourth,
loss of jobs and going-concern value are generally not at stake in singleasset real estate cases. In the usual case, if a debtor loses the property to
a new owner, the new owner operates the property in the same general
manner as the debtor, rhus preserving the same number of jobs and economic activity in the community.ll
The definition of single asset debtors is provided in Section 101 (51 B) of
the Bankruptcy Code:
[t]he term "single asset real estate" means real property constituting a
single property or project, other than residential real property with fewer
than 4 residential units, which generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor who is not a family farmer and on which no substantial
business is being conducted by a debtor other than the business of operating the real property and activities incidental.
The actual protection for lenders in SARE cases is contained in 11 V.S.c.
§ 362(d)(3), under which a single asset real estate debtor must, within 90
days of the bankruptcy filing (extendable by the court), either file a plan of
reorganization that has a reasonable prospect of confirmation or begin making interest payments to the mortgagee calculated at the nondefault rate of
interest. 12
The mechanics of the rule fit the underlying problem well. Many single
asset debtors have no real prospect of reorganization. However, the Chapter 11 creates a delay that may hurt the creditor while allowing the debtor
to speculate on an improvement in the real estate market (encouraging as
much delay as possible). The proceeding may also allow the debtor to apply
rents that have been pledged to the lender as additional security, toward its
bankruptcy costs so that, in essence, the lender is paying for the debtor's op-

262

SINGLE ASSET REAL ESTATE AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

position to its attempt to enforce its mortgage. Section 362(d)(3) requires
that, within 90 days, the debtor must either prove that it has a feasible reorganization plan in prospect or else protect the lender from the harm of delay
by paying interest on the debt.
The short deadline makes sense because the reorganization plan for a
SARE debtor is a relatively simple affair: with no significant creditors other
than the mortgagee and no operations to restructure, there are no complex
business questions to resolve or difficult multiparty negotiations to work
through. A SARE plan generally amounts to either speculation that future
financing or a sale may appear or cramdown of the mortgage debt. Either of
these plans is fairly straightforward, so there is much less need than in other
cases for a lengthy period in which to develop, negotiate, draft, and propose
a reorganization plan.
If the plan is not filed before the deadline, the debtor must begin paying
interest to the mortgagee. In most cases, the real estate will not be generating
sufficient income to cover its expenses and pay the interest - otherwise the
debtor would not have defaulted in the first place. Thus, Section 362(d)(3)
basically ensures that if a reorganization plan is not promptly proposed, the entire net operating income from the property will be paid to the lender. Further,
the debtor's equity holders will most likely have to contribute capital simply in
order to make the interest payments, providing another important disincentive
to filing merely to delay foreclosure or to maintain a hopeless case.

THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Whether the SARE provisions apply to development projects is a matter
of statutory interpretation. Unfortunately, the Code's definition of single asset real estate is ambiguous. Section 101 (51 B) defines SARE as "real property
... which generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor ... and on
which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor other than the
business of operating the real property and activities incidental."
A critical phrase that sheds light on the scope of this provision is "the
business of operating the real estate." In Kara Homes, the court concluded
that the Affiliates were SARE entities because all of their income would come
from selling the properties, once developed; but selling real estate is not the
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same as "operating" it. One talks about "operating" existing real estate, like a
shopping center or office building, but the process of developing or constructing a new project is not typically referred to as "operating the real estate," nor
is selling the developed real estate considered "operating" it. One would
certainly not confuse "operating" a farm, a factory, or a car with building and
selling it. Thus, the process of development or construction is a "substantial
business" other than "operating the real estate."
The legislative history, sparse though it is, supports this reading. The
phrase "real property on which no business is being conducted by the debtor
other than the business of operating the real property and activities incidental
thereto" dates from a Senate draft of the relief from stay provisions of Section 362(d) for the 1978 Bankruptcy CodeY The language was omitted
before passage, only to reappear in the 1994 amendments. However, as was
explained when the language was first introduced, the phrase was intended
to:
reach the single asset apartment type cases which involve primarily tax
shelter investments and for which the bankruptcy laws have provided a
too-facile method to relay [sic] conditions, but not the operating shopping center or hotel cases where attempts at reorganization should be
permitted. 14
Thus, it was not seen as an all encompassing definition, but one that would
capture passive investment vehicles. 15 This emerges, as well, in Section 363( d)
(3), which provides that the rents from the property may be used to make
payments to the creditor to avoid the lifting of the stay - development projects generally have no rents.
Many courts have commented that in passing the SARE amendments
in 1994, Congress was aware of the meaning of the phrase "singe asset real
estate" from prior case law, and thus the statutory definition should be read
with those prior cases in mind. 16 Prior to the SARE amendments, a principal
attack on single asset real estate cases was an assertion that the case was filed
in "bad faith," and that there was thus "cause" for the judge to dismiss the
caseY While the bad faith argument was unsatisfactory to lenders, because
it depends on the specific facts and circumstances of every case and because
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the standards are vague and inconsistently applied, over time it became a useful tool for sorting our those single asset cases that legitimately belonged in
Chapter 11 and those that were abusing the bankruptcy process.
A review of the single asset "bad faith" case law from 1993 and earlier
discloses scores of cases of which the drafters of the 1994 amendments would
have been aware, very few of which appear to have involved ongoing construction or development - and those few support the view that these types
of projects are not the inherently abusive situations that Congress was seeking
to addressY

ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE ACTIVITIES
For example, in One Fourth Street,19 the debtor had purchased a 10 story
office building and borrowed funds to renovate it. Although the renovations
were finished, leasing was slower than expected and the debtor defaulted,
subsequently filing for bankruptcy. The court refused to dismiss the case as a
bad faith filing, distinguishing the renovation situation from a typical single
asset case:
[T]he Debtor operates a business in the conventional sense of the word.
The business, which is an ongoing concern, consists of the ownership, lease
and management of the office building owned by the Debtor. The building project was undertaken as a rehabilitation and development project.
The loan from Florida Federal involved an acquisition and development
objective. Neither the Debtor nor Florida Federal anticipated any cash
throwoff for the first four to five years of the project. Unfortunately for all
parties involved, the Debtor's timetable for profitability was adversely affected by a softening office rental market. However, the Debtor has made
significant progress in leasing up its space despite market conditions. 20
The court recognized the inherent difference between renovating and
re-leasing a building and simply owning and managing the property. The
former is an ongoing active business, justifying an opportunity to reorganize,
while the latter is essentially a passive investment. 21
The motion to dismiss a bad faith filing was granted in In re Rad Proper-
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ties,22 where the debtor had been trying to develop single family lots for sale.
It filed for bankruptcy on the eye of foreclosure, having been unable to complete development even after full funding of the development loan. It had
also been largely unsuccessful in selling the lots it had completed. The court
held that the filing was in bad flith for a combination of reasons. First, there
was no development operation to rehabilitate, because the development company consisted solely of one person. ~3 Second, the debtor filed the day before
summary judgment would have been entered against it in a state foreclosure
action, "strong evidence," the court said, that the debtor filed "merely to delay
or frustrate the legitimate efforts of its secured creditors."24 Third, the debtor
had no realistic chance of reorganizing successfully.25 Not surprisingly, the
finding that there was no hope for reorganization and that the filing was
merely to delay and frustrate the mortgagees led to a "bad faith" dismissal. 26
We could expect the same result today in a construction or development
case where the loan had been fully funded and the project was incomplete
and unsalvageable. It does not follow, of course, that Congress intended the
debtor to be subject to the requirements of Section 363(d)(3).
The courts have generally recognized the distinction between active and
passive holdings in determining SARE status. In the recent Fifth Circuit decision in In re Scotia, the court quoted with approval the following language
from a district court case:
In order to be single asset real estate, the revenues received by the owner
must be passive in nature; the owner must not be conducting any active business, other than merely operating the real property and activities
incidental thereto. Under the prior jurisprudence, those passive types of
activities are the mere receipt of rent and truly incidental activities such
as arranging for maintenance or perhaps some marketing activity, or ...
mowing the grass and waiting for the market to turn. 27
A debtor engaged in developing a property is not engaged in "the mere
receipt of rent and truly incidental activities." The single asset paradigm just
does not fit.
Bankruptcy experts who have considered single asset real estate cases have
typically ignored projects under development or in construction because they
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do not generally raise the same concerns as passive investment vehicles. Consider, for example, this description of the "paradigm of the single asset case"
1.

The debtor is an investment vehicle, usually a partnership, but occasionally
a corporation, that was formed for the purpose of holding the single asset
as an investment, rather than to operate an ongoing business. As such, the
demise of the debtor will not mean that a business fails and that employees
lose their jobs, but rather that the particular owners of the partnership or
corporation will lose their equity as creditors take over the asset.

2.

The asset owned by the debtor is almost always real estate. The real estate
is generally income producing, given the obvious and generally insurmountable difficulties of reorganizing a nonincome-producing asset.

3.

The immediate cause of the filing of the case is usually a default in one
or more secured obligations. Unsecured obligations, typically trade debt
arising from the operation of the single asset, are much less significant
and generally are a small fraction of the debtor's total obligations. The
case usually centers around a dispute with one or more secured creditors,
because unsecured creditors (and in some cases, junior secured creditors)
have little or no hope of recovering on their claims absent a successful
reorganization.

4.

The debtor's default in its secured obligations is generally the result of a
recession or other cause that leads to a reduction in occupancy and rentals,
leaving the debtor with too little cash flow to service its secured debt. 28

Similarly, the Bankruptcy Review Commission (as prominent a gathering of bankruptcy experts as you will find) spent 66 pages on the issues raised
by single asset real estate and proposals for further reforms to the SARE provisions. It gave examples of difficult situations and whether they should fit
under the definition;29 but the report does not contain even one word about
development projects or properties under construction, and every SARE is
about a completed and operating asset (office building, factory, strip shopping center, regional shopping mall).
Kara seems to draw a line between real estate businesses and companies
that use real estate in some other line of business. However, the distinction

267

THE BANKING LAW JOURNAL

in the Code is actually between companies that do nothing but "operate real
estate," and active businesses,3o the same distinction drawn in One Fourth
Street. The value of the former is largely inherent in the asset, and little or no
value is lost through foreclosure, so the costs and delay of Chapter 11 serve no
purpose. An active development or construction project, however, requires
Chapter 11 to preserve going concern value for the benefit of all creditors and
other stakeholders.
Note that the requirements of Section 362(d)O) do not make sense in
the development or construction context. The SARE amendments have addressed lender complaints about unjustified bankruptcy cases. However,
Congress did not bar SARE entities from filing for bankruptcy. It provided
that a lender would be entitled to relief from the automatic stay, to proceed
with state foreclosure, if a SARE debtor did not promptly either file a realistic
plan or commence interest payments. This ~as a critical victory for lenders,
which othetwise might spend months or years without receiving payments on
the debt despite the fact that the debtor was collecting rents from the property - and which might even see the rents used to finance the bankruptcy
case and reorganization efforts it opposes. 3 !
This protection, which prevents diversion of the rents, makes sense for
operating properties. However, if applied to development projects, the payment requirement is an instant death knell for the bankruptcy case. The
debtor would find itself required to make interest payments despite the fact
that the project does not yet have any income - a requirement that will be
impossible for almost any development project to meet. This is recognized
in the very structure of most development and construction loans, which do
not require any loan payments until the project is finished or provide for the
lender to fund the payments to itself through an interest reserve set up from
the construction loan funds. It would be odd for the bankruptcy requirement
for a debtor seeking to reorganize to impose harsher payment terms than the
loan documents themselves.

THE POLICY ARGUMENTS
The fundamental objection to single asset Chapter 11 filings is that there
is no bankruptcy justification for the proceeding - the case does not involve
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preserving or enhancing going concern value, or preserving jobs, or maximizing the recovery for creditors. Rather, it is a simple battle between the owner
and the mortgage lender for rights to an asset of fixed value. Whoever owns
the property, space will be leased, rent will be collected, and expenses will be
paid. There is little if any value in the management of the asset (a service that
is easily purchased, in any case); the value is in the ownership of the asset. This
is true if the property is a shopping center, office building, apartment complex, warehouse, or even undeveloped land. In such a circumstance, there is
no justification for delaying the lender's right to foreclose or for incurring the
costs of a bankruptcy proceeding.
The same cannot, however, be said of a real estate development project.
In a development project or building construction the developer may bring
critical skills and personal, professional and contractual relationships to the
project. Loss of the developer is likely to mean delays, cost overruns, and the
loss of real economic value as a new manager takes over a complex process of
interrelated activities. This loss of economic value means that there is likely
to be less available to pay creditors, as well as a greater potential liability for
any guarantors. These are the precisely the types of losses that bankruptcy is
designed to prevent.
Moreover, many development projects are not simple two party dispures,
as true single asset cases usually are. A development project may involve
contracts with numerous parties to provide takeout financing, architectural
services and construction management, construction materials and labor,
leasing and brokerage services. It may include obligations to the local government for infrastructure development. It will often involve the rights of
tenants who have signed leases for the space once it is developed or buyers who have signed purchase agreements. Failure of the development may
mean large losses not just for the developer and lender, but also for numerous
suppliers and contractors whose rights may need to be protected through a
reorganization proceeding.32
In many cases, a development or construction loan made to the debtor
will have been guaranteed by the individual(s) or development company behind the project. This means that the resolution of the single asset case is
inseparable from the reorganization of the developer itself. We see precisely
this reasoning in the recent ruling in General Growth Properties. 33 General
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Growth is one of the nation's largest real estate firms, developing and operating major shopping centers around the United States. The bankruptcy
proceeding included 388 related entities that had filed, many of which had
been established to own and operate a specific project. While the case did not
discuss whether these entities were SARE, the court denied creditors' motions
to dismiss the filings by solvent subsidiaries as "bad faith" by looking to the
interests of the corporate group as a whole. 34
A similar analysis in Kara Homes would have recognized that Kara Homes
(the developer) and the Affiliates are part of a business operation that must be
considered as a whole. While the lenders wanted to count on a "bankruptcy
remote" structure to insulate themselves from the cost and delay of a reorganization proceeding, removing the individual projects causes the piecemeal
dismemberment of an operating business enterprise. Neither the Affiliates
nor Kara Homes would likely be worth as mllch without the others. And in
all probability, the lenders advanced their funds in reliance on Kara Homes'
repuration and overall financial strength, in addition to the specific collateral,
expecting that Kara Homes would ensure the successful development and the
ultimate sales or refinancings that would pay them back.
Considering the interest of the overall enterprise, rather than looking at
each debtor in isolation, is consistent with other examinations of the SARE
provisions and their purposes. The Bankruptcy Review Commission, for
example, stated that
[w]hether the debtor uses real property in an active business should be
viewed in terms of economic substance rather than the form of ownership. Thus, where a debtor conducting an active business holds title to
the real property used in that business through a separate entity, the entity holding the real property should not be considered a SARE debtor. 35
While the authors of the Commission report do not appear to have been
thinking about a development company (as noted previously, the report
seemed to assume, sub silentio, that all SARE cases involve already completed
properties), the reasoning applies precisely to a case like Kara Homes.
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CONCLUSION
The Kara Homes decision is troubling because it places form above substance, allowing creditors to dismember an ongoing real estate development
business in a piecemeal fashion - exactly what bankruptcy is designed to
prevent. This is not what Congress intended when it provided extra protections for mortgagees whose debtors were solely engaged in "operating the real
estate." We can see that not only from the language, but from the very nature
of the relief provided - relief that makes sense for debtors holding operating
properties, but not for debtors whose properties are under construction or
development.
Recognizing that development projects do not fall within the definition
of SARE does not leave the lender without protections. It can seek to have
the case dismissed as having been filed in bad faith, or to have the automatic
stay lifted under Section 362(d)(2) because the debtor lacks equity and has
no reasonable prospect for reorganization, if those things are true. If they are
not true, it is still entitled to adequate protection of its security interests and
to a powerful role in the reorganization process. On the other side, however,
if the debtor does have the prospect of successfully reorganizing the project
by obtaining financing and completing development or construction, for the
benefit all the involved parties, it will have its opportunity to do so without
the unduly short deadline or unrealistic payment obligations imposed by Section 362(d)(3).

NOTES·
1
Primarily the passage of the single asset real estate provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S. C. §§ 101(51B), 362(d)(3), discussed below.
2 There are two primary changes in structuring that have had a significant impact.
The first is the move to using "bankruptcy remote" entities to hold the real estate.
See generally Michael D. Fielding, Preventing Voluntary and Involuntary Bankruptcy
Petitions by Limited Liability Companies, 18 Bankr. Dev. ]. 51 (2001); Matter of
GlobalShip Systems, LLe, 392 B.R. 193 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) (involuntary case
dismissed as having been filed in bad faith in part because petition was an attempt
to avoid LLC provisions designed to allow creditor to block a bankruptcy filing); but
see In re General Growth Properties, 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (declining
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to dismiss cases as bad faith filings despite the fact that, on the eve of filing for
bankruptcy, debtor LLCs replaced "independent managers" which, under the
Operating Agreements, were required to "consider only the interests of the Company,
including its respective creditors" in voting on any proposal to file for bankruptcy).
The second is the widespread adoption of nonrecourse carveouts and springing
guaranties. See generally John C. Murray, Exploding and Springing Guaranties, in
MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 2009 (SR001 ALI-ABA 1321) (2009); Marshall
E. Tracht, Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, 117 Bank. L.J. 129 (2000).
3 Courts following Kara Homes include: In re MTM Realty Trust, 2009 WL
612147 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009); In re Vtzrgas Realty Enterp. Inc., 2009 WL 292958
(Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re web MTN, LLC, 207 WL 2746894 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
2007); In re ACA Real Estate LLc' 2008 WL 4899024 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. 2008); In
re Triumph Inv. Group, Inc., 2009 WL 2916986 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 2009).
4 In re Kara Homes, Inc., 363 B.R. 399 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
sId. at 402-03.
6 In re Philmont Dev. Co., 181 B.R. 220 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
7 Id. at 223.
8 363 B.R. at 405.
9 !d. at 406.
10 181 B.R. at 223 fn 1.
11 See
National Bankruptcy Review Comm'n, National Bankruptcy Review
Commission Report, Ch. 2: Business Bankruptcy, Single Asset Proposals (Oct. 20,
1997) at 673 ("BRC Report").
12 Section 362(d)(3) reads:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by
terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-

* * *
(3) with respect to a stay of an act against single asset real estate under subsection
(a), by a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in such real estate, unless,
not later than the date that is 90 days after the entry of the order for relief (or such
later date as the court may determine for cause by order entered within that 90day period) or 30 days after the court determines that the debtor is subject to this
paragraph, whichever is later(A) the debtor has filed a plan of reorganization that has a reasonable possibility
of being confirmed within a reasonable time; or
(B) the debtor has commenced monthly payments that(i) may, in the debtor's sole discretion, norwithstanding section 363 (c)(2),
be made from rents or other income generated before, on, or after the date
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of the commencement of the case by or from the property to each creditor
whose claim is secured by such real estate (other than a claim secured by a
judgment lien or by an unmatured statutory lien); and
(ii) are in an amount equal to interest at the then applicable nondefault
contract rate of interest on the value of the creditor's interest in the real
estate; ....
13 For a discussion of the legislative history, see H. Miles Cohn, Good Faith and the
SingLe-Asset Debtor, 62 Am. Bankr. L.J. 131 (1988).
14 Id. at 138, citing S.REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1978).
15 See H. Miles Cohn, SingLe Asset Chapter 11 Cases, 26 Tulsa L.J. 523, 526-27
(1991).
16 See, e.g., In re Scotia, 508 F.3d 221, 223-24 (5th Cir. 2007).
17 Under Bankruptcy Code Section 1112(b), a bankruptcy case can be dismissed "for
cause, including" a list of various specific factors. Courts have generally held that bad
faith filing provides "cause" for dismissal.
18 See, e.g., In re Carolin Corp., 886 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1989) (existing 80,000 square
foot industrial building); In re Phoenix PiccadiLly, Ltd., 849 F.2d 1393, 1395 (lIth
Cir.1988) (apartment complex); In re NaturaL Land Corp., 825 F.2d 296 (11 th Cir.
1987) (unimproved pasture land); In re LittLe Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 1068, (5th
Cir.1986) (undeveloped land); In re ALbany Partners, Ltd., 749 F.2d 670,674 (lIth
Cir. 1984) (operating hotel); In re Thirtieth PLace, Inc., 30 B.R. 503 (9th Cir. B.A.P.
1983) (land intended for development, but no development started); In re DeL Rio Dev.,
Inc., 35 B.R. 127 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1983); In re 441 Miami Gardens Drive Partnership,
154 B.R. 354 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992) (shopping center); PLeasant Pointe Apartments,
Ltd. v. Kentucky Housing Corp., 139 B.R. 828 (WD.Ky. 1992) (completed housing
project); In re Tampa MedicaL Tower L.E, 145 B.R. 99 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (office
building); In re CoLoniaL Daytona L. E, 144 B.R. 924 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992)
(apartment complex); In re Punta Gorda Assoc., 143 B.R. 281 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1992)
(ground lease under hotel); In re 441 Miami Gardens Drive Partnership, 154 B.R.
354 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992) (shopping center); In re Denver Investment Co., 141 B.R.
228 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1992) (partial interest in a shopping center); In re Maricamp
Square Associates, Ltd, 139 B.R. 554 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (shopping center);
In re CLub Tower L.E, 138 B.R. 307 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (high-rise apartment
building); In re Panache DeveLopment Company, Inc., 123 B.R. 929 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1991) (undeveloped ocean front property); In re The Miracle Church of God in
Christ, 119 B.R. 308 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1990) ("a tract of real property"); Germania
Bank v. Lindbergh PLaza Assoc., L.E (In re Lindbergh Plaza Assoc., L.E), 115 B.R. 202
(Bankr E.D. Mo. 1990) (shopping center); Matter of Oakbrook VilLage, Inc., 108
B.R. 838 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1989) (apartment complex); In re Metro, Ltd., 108 B.R.
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684 (Bktcy.D.Minn. 1988) (commercial building); In re Marion Street Partnership,
108 B.R. 218 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) (apartment building); In re Club Candlewood
Assoc., L.P, 106 B.R. 752 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (50 building apartment complex);
In re Sarasota Plaza Associates Ltd. Partnership, 102 B.R. 257 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1989)
(office building); In re Garsal Realty, Inc., 98 B.R. 140 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.,1989)
(apartment complex); In re Park Avenue Partners Limited Partnership, 95 B.R. 605
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988) (apartment complex); In re Mill Place Ltd. Partnership,
94 B.R. 139 (Bktcy. D.Minn.1988) (commercial building); In re North Redington
Beach Assoc., 91 B.R. 166, 169 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1988) (hotel); In re Oakgrove Village,
Ltd., 90 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. W.D.Tex.1988); In re Brandywine Associates, Ltd.,
85 B.R. 626 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1988) (apartment complex); In re Anderson Oaks
(Phase I) Ltd. Partnership, 77 B.R. 108, 111 (Bankr. W.D.Tex.1987) (apartment
complex); Matter of Southwest Dev. Corp., 76 B.R. 196 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1987)
(apartment building); Stage I Land Co. v. HUD, 71 B.R. 225 (Bankr.D.Minn.1986)
(housing project); In re Sar-Manco, Inc., 70 B.R. 132 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986) (mobile
home park); In re Jay M. Weisman Irrevocable Childrens Trust of 1981,62 B.R. 286
(Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986) (apartment building); In re Victory Constr. Co., 42 B.R. 145,
149 (Bankr.C.D.Ca1.l984) (building); In re Yukon Enterprises, Inc., 39 B.R. 919
(Bankr.C.D.Cal.1984) (condominium units); In re Landmark Capital Co., 27 B.R.
273 (Bankr. D.Ariz.1983) (office and hotel complex).
19 In re One Fourth Street North, Ltd, 105 B.R. 106 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1989).
20 105 B.R. at 108.
21 See also In re 1-95 Technology-Industrial Park, L.P, 126 B.R. 11 (Bankr. D.R.1.
1991) (refusing to dismiss single asset case where partnership was attempting to
develop an industrial park, despite numerous factors that could be considered indicia
of bad faith, because of extensive efforts to secure approvals, some of which had been
received, and debtor's ongoing plans to develop and market the property).
22 In re Rad Properties, Inc., 84 B.R. 827 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1988).
23 !d. at 830.
24 !d.
25 !d. at 830-3l.
26 For a similar case, see In re Campus Housing Developers, Inc., 124 B.R. 867 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 1991) (dismissing development on finding that no further construction
financing appeared available, there was no reasonable prospect of reorganization,
and filing was "merely to delay RTC from proceeding with the foreclosure sale and
realizing on its collateral").
27 508 F.3d at 221 (quoting In re Club GolfPartners, L.P., 2007 WL 1176010 (E.D.
Tex. 2007).
28 H. Miles Cohn, Single Asset Chapter 11 Cases, 26 Tulsa L.J. 523, 527-28 (1991).
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Id. at 668-69.
Thus, courts have found that SARE did not encompass companies engaged in
hatvesting lumber (In re Scotia Pacific Co., LLC, 508 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2007»,
operating a marina (In re Kkemko, Inc., 181 B.R. 47, 49 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1995»,
or running a golf course (Commerce Bank and Trust Co. v. Perry Hollow Golf Club,
Inc. (In re Perry Hollow Mgmt., Co.), 2000 WL 33679447 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000); In
re CGE Shattuck, 1999 WL 33457789 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999); In re Larry Goodwin
Golf, Inc., 219 B.R. at 391 (Bankr M.D. N.C. 1997)).
31 For a discussion of the battle between lenders and debtors over the use of rems
as "cash collateral," see Lawrence T. Burick, The Undersecured Creditor's Adequate
Protection Rights in the Single Asset Arena: Did the 1994 Bankruptcy Code
Amendments Redress Lender Grievances?, 100 Com. L. J. 437 (1995).
32 See, e.g., Matter 0/East- west Associates, 106 B.R. 767 (S.D.N .Y.1989) (involuntary
bankruptcy filing by mechanics lienors against single asset partnership with unfinished
construction project).
33 In re General Growth Properties, Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
34 Id. at 61-64.
35 BRC Report, supra note 11, at 668.
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